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FOREWORD

What is a cartel? How is it refated to the trust and other forms
of capitalist monopoly?What b its role in world trade? Is the cartel
an instrument of industrial peace or of ccommic &?
Thesc q u d o f l s again uune fmard, as they always do whcn
d
g eeonamic relations arc disturbed hy war or crisis. World
War I1 has h e n followed by a new upsurge of the dunmatic and
mmmunist movements in many p of the world that beaten the
wry b a of~ the cartel system. The war has also r d k d in important chanp among thc imperialist powers, changes that afEact the
u1tirt prewar network of relations among
monopolies of tht
lading countries.
In the midst of this strew and main of the world capitah system, many Eanciful rhowics about the role of the earotl again art
paraded fwth.No matter that these thcoriw a w e d in more or b s

nimitar form in tht previous period, and have bctn thoroughly &
proved by events. The old fantasy abut the possibility d organizing
the world economy under the Icadership of the monopdics, which
has proved so disastrous m Germany and Japan in the late war, reappears today in the form of the pr-d
docrrint, especially in
Britain. h tbc United States, on tbe other hand, a program for world
organization-that is, world dominat-wcs
tke shape of
an a n t i d doarinc with its magic £ornula of free mtcrpk
TbisbattEtdthttitans,somcappwinginthtgukoffrta
enterprisers and others in American eyes as the devil's advocate for
tht cartel q s c c m , has added to the @d i n .
The prcwat pamphlet attempts briefly and d y in an introductory way to Qhowthc basic rclaaon lxtwetn the trust and thc antel,
and to dtsuibt the main aspects of the world carrel system prevailing
3

the war. Changes resulting from the war in relations among
the monop~lyca~italist
powers, various programs and theories now
m t , the position of the Soviet Union and of the democratic movements in r&& to monopoly are treated in my book, World MO&re

aapoly and Pewe.
JAMES

S. AUBN

T h e Cartel System
I. WHAT IS A CARTEL?
A cartel is a form of monopoly combination. Historically, it
arosc in its presentday form only as monopoly capitalism dcvcloped

from the carlicr stage of capitalist fret competition. As the concentration of production proceeded, and with it the centralization of
ownership and control, the modern cartel appeared as one of the
forms of monopoIy, developing simultaneously with the trusts and
combines. Like the latter, it operated both on a domestic and international scale.
In his classic study, Impm;Ilism : The Highest Stage of Capidim, Ltnin summarized thc process by whch monopoly capital
extended its domination, first at home and then on a world scale,
as fouows:

"Monopolist capitalist combines-+art&, syndicates, trustsdivide among themselves, first of all, the whole internal market
of a country, and impose their control, more or less completeIy,
upon the industry of that country. But under capitalism the
home market is inevitably bound up with the foreign market.
Capitalism Iong ago created a world market. As the export of
capital increased, and as the foreign and colonial relations and
the 'spheres of influence' of the big monopolist combines expanded, things 'naturally' gravitated towards an international
agreement among these combines, and towards the formation
of international cartels.
"This is a new stage of world concentration of capital and
production, incomparably higher than the preceding stage." l
By 1916,when Ltnin wrote his Impm'ak'sm, monoply capitalism, dcvelqing rapidly since the turn of thc century, had already
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btcome w d diikcntiatcd as "the h i g h stage of capidism." The
trusts and combits had attained dominating positions ia the #r~nomits of the leading capitalist countries, and had d l i s h d interh k b g connections aaoss national boundaries. Lcnin analyzed tbis
phenomenon to show that the concentration of production and of
capital was assuming world proportions. A? the same time, he
stressed that this process, far from being EKaacful, p m d d bg
marts of struggle and wn9ict among the monopolies within tach
*countryand between the monopolies of the leading capitalist nations.
While &.I
gave main attention to the giant trusts and cambincs,as distioguishtd from tht cwcls, he a h noted the inmasing
rolc of the international cartel. T h e international cartels which
dominate the whole world market, dividing it 'amicably' among
thcmsel~cs-until war brings about a rdvision-already number
over one hundred!" he wrote? Since thtn the socialist revolution in
the former Russian Empire removed a large and i m p o m sector of
tht world market from the orbit of capitalism. But within the -pi& world sector the number of international cartels has i n d
manifold, and their rolt has grown cnormausly.
The dis one of the hrma of monopoly combination, but it
has distinguishing faturcs which account for its i n h g l y important role in world capitalist rdations h t m tht two wars.
For our purpose wt may accept the &&cation of monopoly
cambinations into thrct mahi pups: trusts (LDCT~USand amalgamations), dints, and d.
As will be seen shortly, this is a
rather rough separation and is largely f d , but it dots strye to
draw certain ntcessarg and clemcntary d i s t i n h A merger or
wst is a complete &tion
of a numbcr of companies, h which
each lomi its identity and a new single h emerges. A wmbine is
formed whcn tbe ownership of a number of conctms is interlocked,
resulting in a d a d h a n d and comm& structm while otha
advitits such aa production or plant retain their original idmtity. A
d i n e may a h take the dorm of a single new tntcrprk in which
twoor~campank~ownashipandmntroLInthe~
the participating b n s agrtt to ctrtaia d & n s with respect to
m a r m u c h as p b 6 x i n g , production quotag allocation of
m a r W u t retain their h a n d independence and identity of
mul&uring 0pcrathL'
6
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The latter is the distinction usually made between the ~arfdand
other forms of combination. Thus, according to one cartel apt,
"combhatians which involve the loss of financial independence lie
entirely outside the cartel concept."' And another cartel stdent,
esstntially agreeing with this view, d&cs tbt main fcatura of
-& as 6ollows: ( I ) as a relationship between several ecommic~lly
independent profit-making units, as distinguished from combiitions of a corporate type; (2) as cornpod of actud or potmtial
compFtitors in a c&
commodity or acrvice; and (3) as a private
relationship, which distinguishes a artel from a govcrnmtnt corn
moditp a g r e a n e n ~ ~
Actually, compIcte manufacturing in&@is surdcrtd
in artcI arrangements which set production and q r t quotas. And
ofcm cartel rcktions had to the d h h m c n t of interroeking financial interests among the cartd m&s,
depriving them in varying
degree of thtir complete financial indcpcndtncc. But there is an important distinction, inherent in thwe dcfinitiom. It is that contrary
to the pcoctss of amalgamation or tmstifimtion, tht formation of
cartcls by no means i&cs tbc chinatian of a d i d of interm
k t w t n the individual firms joining the cartel. When a trust is
formed, comptition is completely eliminated b e e n the u n h involved in the new combination. But within the cartel arrangemen&
the competitive struggle p m d a , although by more p a d means,
the participants having -tad
certain conditions and limitations.
Tht cartd has many forms and uses many devices, sordc marc
restrictive, otlms leq ranging from trade mark and simple patent
agreemen& to various measures for &g prices, sming production
qmw, and allocating market territories. It may take the form of
loost agreements only partidy &tin& the markczing activities of
tht participants, or of a full-kdged @tion
in which tbc members
are bound strictly to rcgulatioas aikting all asof their operations. But whether in the kor tighter form of artel, the participants retain their identity as separate firms, and remain more or lcss
i n h h t , depending upon their own tconomic power and their
ability to re& absorption by the more pwcrful man+.
Cad
m
h c o m t l y wry on a suuggle within the artd mangemen?, some s&hg to atend their domination by ahrbing the
lesstr companies, while urhers attempt to p e t &cmdp# h m
7

bdng f
d into combinadoas where they will lost their indtpendcnce complcrdy.
Thus, the c a r d may be considered the high road leading from
fiae enterprise to monopoly combination. It is an imptaut medium
through w&ch tht monopolies extend thcir domination of the
domestic and world economy. Thh is cxrmpI&ed on a national
scaie by the trade assmiation,* through which the leading monopolies
in tach industry or branch of production estaMish certain uoiform
pdidcs to which the weaker and smaller producers art k c d to
a k . In Germany, the wade asxiations provided the ins~umcnt
£or the most complete cardhtion of the economy under the lcadtrship of the giant manopoly combinations. A similar role is perf o r d by the trade m i a t i o n s of England and the United States,
mart pronounced in the former, but in both muntries serving as the
ecntral medium of cartehtion?
The international cartels are an extension of the domestic cartels,
but in another form. The main pariidpants in the world cam1 systcm art usually the pmH monopolits, which have already come to
dominate the domatic fiJd through thtir own direa control of pr*
duaion or by virtuc of their contml of the trade associations. A
partidpaat in a world catel can exert his power in the allocation
of markets ody the cxtcnt that he has alrmdy gained a dominant
position in the home mark& However, it is not unusual for uade
asdations in which control is shared by two or more dominant
firms to d h h sptcial export associations to participate in a
world~JntheUnitcdsmtcssuchgportcaretlsarc~~
considered pcmissiblc under the Webb-Pommne Act; and in Britain, cspchlly during the war, thc d o d c aimciatiom formed many
export cartels in preparation foi the pawar struggle for markets.
T& d i h c k h already made bawtta the c a d and other forms
of monopoly combinadon is an irnpmtant one and is basic to an
analysis of the international cartel mwcment. But it must nor bc
taken too f o d y . All forms of monopoly represent mentially
the samt process of centralization of ownership and control, but
a t d i j k n t levels.Thecartclisthclowestform,thc vustormugcr
'In the United Stws, d
g to a shrdy by tbe Taaporary National

E e o n d c W t t t e (TNE),

there are 8,000 trade

rPhieh~artnntioPalia8dope.
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the highest and the combine the intermediate form of combinah.
Cartels are part of the general process towards combination and
amalgamation. This was placed quite clmrly by one of the leading
world txtclists, the o r g a b of the giant British chemical trust, Sir

&d

Mond (Lord M&m) :
"I use the word cartel to indude fusion, pooling arrangements, quota ~gcmenuand prkt convmtions, because a
c a r d is protean in its form.
In an ultra technical way, a
cartel may be d&ed as a combination of producers for the

...

purpose of ~egdating,as a 4%
production, and, frequently,
prices. That does nut involve giving up the identity of the d8fercnt firms. It is not usually made for a pc'iod lasting more
than a limited time. It docs not necessarily a r r y with it, though
in some cases it d m , joint d i n g agencies. &metimes, -,-it
carries with it quotas of production. But all this is, perhapq too
narrow a ddinition. Thc Gumans have a term ZnCcrc~smgmeinschaj3
a union or similarity of interest. The great
German Dye Trust [L G. Farben] started with what t h y call
Intcressm-gemn'mchafb.When &st formed it was a fairly loost
combination ta regulate production and p r i m It hm been sub~br'twtcddace by am absolute md complete fusion mad exchange
of shares-whaa we would cull a mmpkte amalgum&'mwhkh is the liffsland most c~mpletcfmof my kind of c a d
whid cun &e imagined." (Emphasis mine.-JSA.)'

.. .

It is thraugh such a "union of interest"-imposed by the more
powerful u p the less powerful--dltarting as a "simple" d ar-

rangement, tiaat many of the super-comb- have been formed. But
to see this as part of the process of comvation, as the M o n of
dtsclopment, without at the same time geeing the contradictions and
a&ct within this pmess is to recognize only half the truth. For
the -el
is tsstntially an unstable and temporary arrangement, an
armistice or a truce bdwten the monoplies witbin a country or d
various countries. It is a means of tmporarily regulating the struggle
which has become too costly, of hitting ofl agreements between the
giant competitors until such a time as new economic and poliihd
developmen& leading to a new rclation of Sopccs, ausc the struggle
to be resumed in a more open form. On thh point a
h the cartel
9

magnate aIrcady qwtcd prwod quite @KC. Discussing the d S cuItg of obtaining a free cxchatlgc of taehnologicd information
among c a d m e m b Sir Alfred M o d wrote:
'% artel or combination which exists o d y for a Wttd
in d t y nothing more than an armistice
in industrial warfare; and people arc not going to hand ovcr
anns and methods of wadart to hose who in a few years may
bc fighting them again." *
number of ycars is

The combine is tbe more stable and the trust the most stable
form of monopoly cambination. International carttb arc temporary,
fluctuating, and unstable combinations, although some may prove
more enduring than others. They function in the rcatn of intermonopoly and inter-imperialistmnflict. The presence or the absence
of cart& in this or &at sphere reflects the state of war or relative
peace among the monopolies on a world scale, except in those &Ids
whae a giant monopoly or a closely interlocked group has been able
to establish its hegemony without the kdt of carttl arrangements.
It would be erroncorn to think of inter-monopoly relations in
p a a l , and the meh in particular, only in the narrow economic
m,only as a development taking place separately from basic
nomic and poliricaf world relations. The great conatration of economic power in ach of tht leacapitalist countries, the met;
tiom established h e e n the monopoly groups of various countries
and the rivalries among them, a&a all politid arrangements between nations. The level of aconomic developrntnt within a country,
the rate of growth in this or that branch of the economy, penetration abroad through the export d capital and the establishment of
spheres of duencc, the +on
of wfonies, the military power
of the nations, the level of govcrnmcnt intervation and control in
the & m d c economy and in foreign ecommic relatiow rhe foreign
@CS
of g o v ~ e n t arc
4 ingredients, somttimts hidden, at
other times quite o p , of the c a d fwmatioa
For thee reasong the m d srnrccurc k a m e an txtrrmcly
k t i v e indicator of the actual economic and political power relations among tbe leading apitalist countries, and between various
bran& of industry and trade. For a given period, the cartel smm

-
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the status of the inter-monopoly m g g h for world
markets among the chief contenders. The collapse of a cartel in one
field indicates that the struggle in that sphere has again broken out
hto tht open. The restoration of the cartel, or tht creation of a new
one, records the o u t m e of the suugglt, sign%- that a wet bas
bccn e b l i s h c d until uneven economic dtvclopment as bawecn
countria and industries or ncw political upsets bring about still
another struggle.
Not only individual c a d s , but the cartel mwturc as a w b l c
have bcea basically revised or even temporarily suspended during
@ads of economic crisis or war. After the grcat crisis broke out
in rgag most c a d &cly
cased to function for a brief period,
lading one British eeonamist to remark that t . drastic plunge of
prices had "cawed the virtuaI breakdown of almost all the existing
control s c h w , and for a short time in the spring of ~ g itplooked
as if tbt individualist Iaissez-fmre system would be restored." Bur
even in the course of the crisis th; cart& bad kgun to re-form,
responding to the new relationship being d l k h t d , as the crisis
a&&
various countria and industries differently, Ervin Hmer,
an American cartel student, notes that as a result of thc crisis, "almost all international control schemes (cspecidy, the p t e r part
of the international cartels) which cxistcd before 1930,were reshapbd
in the m n d interwar decade."
In the two world wars, cartel arrangements were as a rule suspended, although in both wars some international, cartels continued
to operate But as a whole, the prewar cartd structures lost their
significance, and cartel arrangements were held in abeyance to await
thc new relations which would be established as a result of the war.
During the world wars, markets were wmp1ctdy disorganized, and
the basic induswks devoted entirely to war production no longcr
found necessary the regulation of capacity and markets provided by
cartels. In each
the consolidation of victory presented new
problems, and the political devcIopments merging from the d a
new cirtrumstanccs which had to bc taken into account in the re-forming of h e dstruaure.
In their broadcx sigtdcance cards r& the whole interplay
of monopolistic forces and of inter-imperialist r&tions.
ture registers

Cartel experts disagree sharply on which mompo1y combinations
s h o d be considered carpels. For legal reasons-to avoid p r w u tion uadtr the American anti-trust laws-the economists of tht trusts
hold that tht patent licensing agreement and the combine arc nor,
pmperIy speaking, cart&. But since patent agreements p o t m ~all
the attributes of a cartel arrangement among iadcpdmt concerns,
and since the combine is a transitional form bctwtm the cartel and
the trust, they can be p r o ~ l y
included in the cartel conocpt. W y
iudcpendent economists agree with Corwin D.Edward%for a time
chairman of the Policy Board of the Anti-Trust Division, in cladfying cart& into three main groups: the cartel a ~ a t i o nthe
, patcnt
agreement, and the combint10
In the first group m y be included the simple price, des, trademark, specialization, and marketing agreements bctwten a number
of firms. AIso in this category art the informal w & c s and lame
asmiations operating under "gentIemenYs"agreements. Thc arrangements are very diverse, varying according to industry or trade. A
higher form of this type of arrangement is the d i n g syndicate,
which acts as a central agency for its members and is usually authorized m regulate output and prices. Tk highest form is the doscly
knit association, which usually has a central agency empowered
to carry out and enforce the agreement.
An example of the somewhat Iooser type of asmiation in a very
competitive field was the North Atlantic Conference, which divided
up shipping between tbc German and Angl~Amcricanintcrcsts,
i d u h g 16 of the biggest international companks. Typical of the
mort completely formed cartel association was the International
RaiJmakers Association which controlled over 85 pu cerrt d capidist world production of rails* It allocated world markets by setting
quotas for its m c m h in Britain, the Unittd States, Germany,
France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and a Cemal Europmn pup."
The International Copper Card excmplifics the high degree of
centralized control txt&
by fully dcvcioptd a t e l assaciatiom
RECstablishod in 1935 under an agreement subsequently extended
until rgqr, the Intanatid Copper Cart4 ewerod produdm and
distribution of the main c o p p cornpanics operating outside tht
I2

able part of the inttrnahal trade of the world bt brought
under a high degree of commdty control, but the distinction
ktwtcn cartels and commodity agreements will b m e progressively less meaningful." l4

To classii all government commdity agreements as cartels is
incorrect and mn£using.In a purely form4 mse, both private cart& and inttr-government commodity arrangcments can be cladkd
as commdty agrwncntq and both often use thc same devices to
achieve their o b j d v c , such as production a d export quotas, and
prim %wing. All or some of thcst mcthoda were used in the intergovernment agreements on coffee and wheat. Similar devises arc
used by the gavcrflment to regulate agricultural production and
prices in the Unit& Statts.
Some government m d t y agreements arc mrtels and o t h m
are not. The distinction is to be found in whether tht a-ent
rep
restati primarily an assuciation of monopoliists (with government
partidpation or s p d p ] , or w h e k it performs some other,
non-monopoly function. Thw the government agreements on d c c
a d wheat caanot, properly spealrig, be considered cartels, although
they ust similar dcvides,
agreements represent govmamult
intervention hthe economy for the purpose of regulating the p r o d u ~
tion and marketing of products which are produced by innumerable
growers. Such agreuncnb may optrate in practice more to the advantage bf the largest planters and of the marketing and financial
conthan to the hundreds of thousands of d and madim
producers. But that does not of itself m a n that they are agrccmeats

of thc m o n o p l y ~ e type.
l
On the & band, cartehi of the monopoly type, especially sing
World War I, have kcasingly been formed with the sponsorship
of governmenu and sometimes inwlvad their dirm participation.
A wd-known emxnplt is the International Tin Cornmitt- which
was organid by the British and Dutch govemmcnts when tht
private monopoly producers failed to read agreement. Menhership
in the mmmittec and restridom of output were made camputsory
by law, and national export quotas were set £or the producers in
British Malaya, Bolivia, the Dutch East Indics and Nigeria, A similar a r m p e n t was tht International Rubber Convention, and to a
lcscr mtnt tbc sugar agreement to which the United State govern-

'4

ment was a partner. Governmentaganid or sponwrad cart& of
this type usually involve raw materials of which the o u p t or pse

casing is already highly monopolized.
In a r d a n c c with its economic policy, a pernment may sponsor d o m d and international cartels in industrial pducta aa w&
In the United Statcs for a brid period, during the #.xmomic mi&
of the Wa, the goucmment promotmi domestic cartels under
N,RA. Code* In Gumany, even before Hider came to power, rhe
&-tion
of the economy pracdtd under govcrnmtnt aegis;
and in England the government for some time has followed a prrt
cartel policy. For certain important industrial materials, mrch as
mppcr, the production of which was greatly increased during the
war, the United Statcs may conclude commodity agreemen@ or
o&ally s p m r private cartel arrangements to take cart of the surplus s t d s and allocate the new production. Negotiations regarding
copptr were rtported under way at the end of 1944 among thc governments and corporations m c ~ r n e d Actually,
.~
tht over-all tendency of dtvdopmcnt is for growing government intervention in one
dorm or anather in the cconomy, including the cartel system, on r
national and international dc.
The patent-Easing agreement assumed inamsing impwtancc
with the growth of new industries, the "laboratory indusuiqn in
which constant m r c h for new materials and proccssts was necasary. It is dm important in the older industries whm new processes
and new materials were introduced.* The pat- a g r m is
prdably the most common form of participation by American firms
in inunmiod a d s , one of the m n s for this being that such
arrangements can bt morc easily upheld against the provisions of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. And it is for this reason a h that the
corporation ceommists and lawyers contend that the patent license
does not, properly speaking, belong to the cartel category. But as
Edwards shows in his study, agmmtnts by which patents art lidout to participating firms usually docate salts territory, and
set prices, produetion quotas and marketing rules for she product
fm which the patent is issued. AU kin& of variations occur.
Indwtrits ~II
which pamt agreements play a most impwtant role im
dudc: chcmica, electrical and cl&
equipment, machine, mdlrugy,
radio, & d u a l d
s a d synthetics telegraphy end telepky.
'5

An outstanding example of an all-indusive agreement of thb
type was the arrangement between du Pont and Imperial Chemiml
X n d d (I.CJ.), the British monopoly, wvtring practically all
their products. The agrmmmt was part of a whok network of pacts,
resulting in the division of the world market among the chunical
rnof Britain, Germany, and the United Smtts. Imperial Chunicab had a p a d d agmment with L G. FarWdustrie, tbe giant
GaPzan monopoly, and a h with the Belgian Solvay, in which the
comact with du Pont had to bt propcrly proteetad. Thug an agreement ~ W Q L~ CDI and L G. Farben on a specific product had to
take into account the W t i m alrtady a g e d upon b e e n I.Cd.
and du Pant, And similarly, without necessarily entering into a
diract pact with 1. G. F:arbtn, du Pont was obliged to honor the division of markets bctwccrr the German uust and 1.C-I: Actually, according to the -t:
of Justice records, a gentlemen's agrm
mcnt did exist k w e m du Pont and I. G. Farben whereby they were
o
m to give caeh other first option on patents and pracesses not
already promised to others. In &ect, the arrangements between
LGJ, I. G. F&
and du Pont resulrcd in a world &mid c a r d ,
covering ovw four hundred products ranging hdrugs to munitiom and strategic war mattri&,16
The struchlrt btcomes very complicated, as arrangements on
sp&l pducrs also involve other leading monopolits, which in turn
crtmd the agreemat through a whole maze of a&atQd compania.
Standard Oil's patent qpeumnts with I. G. Farben on ~oooaane
gasoht, synthetic rubber, and oil affected the auto, aviation, and
chcmical industries of the country?T Such arrangement8 arc compliated further by cxchanp of shares, joint ownership, c m interand yarious forms of d i e s o h c s t a b h d in connection with
the working out of patent a g r m t s .
It is o h d&h to dctcrminc where a cartel ends and a combine begins. As heady pointed out, cartels tend to develop into
combines, as the more powerful gain control over the weaker m a -

bas, or as jointly owned c o m e art established to exploit a
market commonly shared, For example, du Porn and I.C.I. formed
the Canadian Industriq Ltd, as a joint subsidiary to act as their
exclusive agency in k d a . In Brazil and Argentina, tbe m e trusts
organid n h i d k i e s known as Duped, which in turn set up a
16

rub-network d monopoly in thew countries tbrougfi part ownership
in &a him. Ofttn a c a r t c l w a g r m among
trusts cventually Itads to a
relation baw#n thcm aa m e s u d in
taking over a greater share of the ownership and control of the
competing corporation. This is exemplified in the relations bmvetn
the G e d Eleaic Co. and the AE.G. (General El&c of

-Y)

:

"In xgzz the GE.and tht A.E.G. concluded a mycar agrtt
mcnt which to a certain went restored the pre-war rtlatiansbip
between the two firms. The agreement provided for thc exchange of patents and the division of thC world market whereby
GX. 'obtained' the markets of the USA, b a l America, and
partly Canada, while the Central and East European markets
were allocated to the German trust. Unlike the position in prewar times, Bowtver, the A.E.G. ceased to be an qua1 participant in this agreement. As far back as 1920 the h a 1 Electric
Co. acquired 25 per cent of the newly issued stock of the
A3.G. This wnnection was grearly strengthened in Iwhen
the American rmst taok over 30 per cent of all thc shares d
the German monopoIy!' l8
Hcrc the dividing h e k t w t t n a cartel agreement and a combine bemmts pretty vague. Yet rhm arc not the only c o d o m
of General Electric. It also has a conmlling interest in the p m d d
Mm*Vickers firm in Engknd, as well as direct investments in
General Electric, Ltd, and in a leading French and two Japanese
eltctrical equipment m c e r a ~ This
. ~ is not all. Also linked with
GX.through interlocking controIs of thc Morgan group is tht International Telephone and Telegraph Co, which holds most of the
st&
of many cabk, radio communications, and telephone cornp i e s throughout the world. And the 1. T.& T. also owns st&
of the International Standard Electric Corp., whkb is a holding company controlling h n s throughout the world tngagd in the manufacture of communications aquipmcnt. This super-combine in the
c l o d y related fields of d%ctricaIequipment and communications is
a h a more permanent type of cartel arrangement, hlstered by
direct ownuship participation in hundreds of separate corn@
in
7
f

many countria. Cartel arrangements of a patent-licensing type exist
bcmca tbe firms in tbe combinc, markets are divided among than,
production quotas are set, and so forth.
This super-world c o d i c , in i d still r&g
many fcaturesr
of the international cartel, in turn eaters into artel relations with
athcr world combines of a similar character. In thc electrical equipment 6cld thcre arc two lesser world combines. Wminghoust
Manufacturing Co. maintains h e connections with the leading
German, English, French, and Japanese producers not indudtd
in the GX.combine. N. V. Philips, incorporated as a Dutch company but whose ownership thc war has rendered rather o h c , is
also a world holding company of giant size, antrolling same eighty
companies engaged in the manufactwe and distribution of radio
quipmen&&ark light buIbs, and other dectrical supplics in many
countries, mmtly in Europe and Latin America. Thus, world cartdization in this field results from agreement among rhrct giant
combines within each of which d - t y p e arrangements exist ide
by side with exchange of sharw and inttrlocking ownership.
Intcrrdatdd stock ownership, holding cornpanics in t h d v e 8
small but controlling tremendous aggregata of productive plant,
h~erkkingdirectorates, family controI, and other devices u d to
build up corporate giants within a single eounuy are also employed
on a world d e . Many instances can be given of nominally hdependent companies, entering into cartel or patent agreements, which
are a d y under a single directorship. Aluminum, Ltd, of Canada,
for txampk, is controlled by the same three W e s which own
the Aluminum Co. of America. Whilc such dcrrelopments art charactcristic d all countries of monopoly capitalism, tbey arc especially
marked in the Amcriw corporate structure and its extensions on
a

world scale.*

An

account of how a giant combine is formed was

'The developmeat of giant d i e , of course, is not pe&ly
A m c h n , U n h u , the British matgarine and fats combine, orwuols 400
cmnpania in 51 counIric8. The Krcuger Match Co, @re its collapse
during the world momk crisis, owned 150 m a d faetdes in 35 wuntries, enjoying a match monopoly or a share in tbc mtc monoply in
15 auutriq and had vasr holdings in mi- w d - p u l p plants, tlaetrica
+acting,

roitroada and other fields.
r8

given a t the Seaate harings on titanium, the most vsluable and
useful of all white pigments for paints, rubber product%g h q paper,
enamel, and otba mareri&.aO The titanium d involwa thc
leading producers in the United Statts, Britaio, Germany, France,
Canada, and Japan. They art linked not only by a mics of tight
agreements among them to govern markets, prices, and production
but also through inwlmking o w d p . The c o m b was formnd
through establishing jointly ownad companies in various countries.
Its history is instnrctiw.
The leading American participant is National L e d Co, listed
among the two hundred largest industrial corporations.* In 19x6,
National Lmd started t o d w n t d of titanium by buying up the
Titanium Pigments Co, formed that year to exploit the process invented by two Amtrican chemists. In the matime, another method
of making the pigmcnt was diseovcrcd in Norway by Gustav Jebsea,
who formad Titan Co., A. S. Control ovcr Jebstn was cstablishad in
1ga7 when National Lead purchased &7 pet cent of Titan'sstock, aud
acquired tht major interest in a French company which had been
set up by Jebsen. Two years later, National Lead and Jcbsen organizcd ~ i t Co,
k h,as their joint holding agency for all foreign
interm. Through this holding company they then organized a new
company in Germany togcther with I. G. Farbcn, to which was
assigned tbt mclusivt territory of most of Europe and the Far East.
But the titanium monopoly thus established was threatened
when still a third prwas invented by a scientist workii in
France, and a company was or@
there to liceme out his
patents. In the Unitmi States thm patents were eventually taken aver
by du Poat, whereupon National Lead entered into a deal with du
Ponr. The a g x m t maintained the monopoly ovcr titanium
within the country betwctn thc two, but granted the right to all foreign pawlrs to Titan Ca, the National Lead holding subsidiary.
The threat having been averted at home, a new danger sooa ap
ptared in the form of a British company which w a s independently
exploiting the F m h patents, The problem was salved by the organization of British Titan Products, Ltd, set up jointly by National
Among the many interests of National Lead are the Patino Tin min#
in Bolivia
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Lad, Imperial Chemial Industrica, and two smaller British com-

The nea 6cld to bc conquered was Canada, The mmt important
there is Canadian XnduSuicp, Ltd, owned jointly
by du P a t and LCI. Here, tm, a new wmpany was organbed,
Canadian Titaniam Pigments, Ltd, as the joint dsidiarp of Canadian Industries and National Lead.However, it trampirod that tht
French process had a h turned up in Japan. Tbis time National
Lead had to call upon T. G. Farbcn, to which it had assigned exdusivc Far Eastern right8. Through their jointly owned German &
sidiary, National Lmd and I. G. F a h f o m d a new company in
Japan together with a lading Japanese chemical concern.
Through joint ownerabip combinad with tight patent agrca
m e , National Lead dominated the world titanium market. In
chemical con-

tbt purdy formal sense, it can be argued that this is not a cartel,
since none of tht par&pating companies retained their identity of
ownership in the ntw arrapanies set up to exploit the prfor the
manufacmc of titanium. Achrdy, it is a a d become a conhime,
crated by National Lead, du Pont, I. G. Barben and Imperial Chemi d s for the joint expIoitation of markets for a single p ; o d ~It is
a higher, more integrated form of the d than the c a d association or the simple licensing agreement. The aim d the cartel is
achieved much more &ec.tively and &ently. T h e titanium cornbine reprtscnta a step towards complete amalgamation, which, as
the British &emid magnate said, "is thc final and mose complete
form of &el which can be imagined!'

An iaevibbIe result of the growth of monopoly during the interwar yaus was the increasing control wer world trade and suviccs

by the c a r d s and other monopoly combinations. As bnopoIy more
and more superseded he compttition in the home market $ simulmmmdp came to dominate the world market as well, The coneentrahn of production and ctnaalized wntrol in thc basic export
idustrim, rht srdzurt by the monoplies of sources of raw materials
in tht ooIonics and dcptndcnt nations, and the exmaion of mrprate
10

intermu on a world scalc, led to monopoly cantrol of world trade.
This gtncraI mdusion is substantiated by t
k weal& of data
available on the operations of the world trusts and combines and the
cartel arrangementsbetween them. Voluminous sttldics on the trusts
and monopolies, and in recent years especially the work of the Ternporary Natiod Economic Committee in the United Stam, record
the growing power and extension of the corporate system on a national and world scale. Side by side with the growth of the tmits,
the cartels have multiplied to such an extent that the editors of
Fwtunc found that "by 1939the cart& had reached numbers beyond
thc ability of any m a t world survey to tabulat~."~
According to one listing, which did not indude patent a m mtnts and the loose typt of carid associations, there were 114 inttrnational c a d in rgrgP A later survey placed Ehc minimum number of c a d s infimihg European trade in 1938and 1 9 9 at X J O O . ~
The Kilgore Committee of tht United States Senate has listed 63
American cornpaties which in 1937had cartel agreements with I. G.
Farbm.= h r d i n g to a tentative listing of tht Anti-Trust Division,
rog American iirm participated in 179 international cartels. But such
figures cau give only a faint iadiation of the actual extent of the
cartel system, which indudes hundreds and thousands of patent
agreements and conventions of various types. Somc approach cornp k control of a product, others involve only partial control. Somc
cart& servc merely as a means of extending contra1 over the laser
@ums by a dominant trust; others arc primarily a medium
through which a number of big producers "regulate" competition
among t h d v t s . *
*Par d
s w h i i hnvt assumed a more d d i d form, ~~g
control mm or lcss mmpletdy over production on a regional or w d
d
c
,
it is possible to daExminc with g~
exactitude thc proportion
d tht world market controlled by them. Thus, among the most impormtth are: tht capper d,
~oavdfiaggo per eat of world pr*
duction in xgp; rail d,
ovEr 6 per cent in rgp; tin cartel, 83 pu cent
in 1932;el& bdb c a d , go p r ~ e nint 1934; rubbtr c a d , 97 per cent
in 1936;Eurdpcan stctl carttl, 45 p cent in 1936;spthcric nitrogra,
~panrinrgp;ortificiPlailk,7o;opcrtin~pg;~um,grpcr
a n t in r g p . ( E , Varga a d L. M e n u editors, NRW DPtrt for
h n ' s InrpmX~rn,p. 196, Wcn York, rw.)
az
tant

Accordingly, judgments vary as ta w W products may be
considered cartelid. And so intricate are the cartel connections, so
multitudinous their forms and devices, so w e n and fluid the
cartel relation, that it becomes almost impossible to f~ their number
or estimate exactly the proportion of the world market under cartel
controt Furthermore, even in the more highly developed and mort
stable form the a d is a medium through which grcatcr trusti&ation and inner conflict proceed simultaneously, bringing about
qualitative change within the system. Such kctors would defy exact
statistical mmsurerncnt, wen if all pminmt data wert available.
Dcspict thest obstacles various attempts have k e n made to
cgtimatt the share of world trade dominated by the cartels. T h e
&m are admittedly unsatishctary, far the reasons already set forth.
Ntverthdess, while presenting an incomplttt picture, they are of
vdue in indicating thc role of thc cartels in the world m a r k .
One estimate made by Ervin Hmex place at 42.6 per cent the
share of world trade in 1937 "dominated or considerably influenced
by marketing controls." This figure includts inter-government cornd t y agreements as in whab m b k , sugar, tin, etc, some of
which do not properly fall within the category of
But according to the author's own dtfinition of "marketing controls" his
figures primarily cover private cartel agreements, excluding, however, arrangementsof tbe patent-licensing type. Cartels in the m i c e
industries, mreh as shipping and other trampomtion, communications, insuxana, and banking arc necesmily excluded. W e thy
afiact txadc and play an important role in cartehation, this cannot
bc cxprased in volume or value of trade. The result can herdore
be considered a very minimum ~ s t i m a t e . ~
Another admittedly exploratory study by Frederick Haussmann
and Daniel Ahatn, employing a Mcrcnt approach and covering
the perid 1~x937,
arrived independcntiy at about the samt estimate+*They summark their tentative findings as follows:

&.

Their tstimate also incIudcs government mmnodi~agmmcnts and
&p
duds EarPJs in the suvicc industries. But patent s g x e ~
mcoh sffecting m a n u f a d goods, are included. T h y divide cortcIs
into thm groups, a&g
to the propMtion of the product d a d
in worM trade: (a) -Is,
in which arc indudcd all products m t r d J
in world wade by p pu cent or more; (b) partial camlization, which
aa

"Taking into account the inaccuracy of the

dmatcd

dw

to the lack of exact statistics, we come to the basic conclusion that
42 per cent of world trade between x p g and 193was carttlizcd

or inaucnccd by loosely knit asmiations or conftrenccs. This
is a minimum estimate.
"To this eshatc, we add the r r q per c a t of world trade inf l u 4 by trusts which were not connected with any cartels.
Thus we can say that 53.7 p r cent of the present total intermt i d trade was i&umcod by cartels or trusts. Trusrs and
oligopolies by themstlves controlled, according to o u r estimate+
ag per a t of world trackn

"

Thw tstimatq admittedly rough and incomplete, show that at
world trade is mttliztd. If to this is added
tht share of world t x p controlkd by trusts alone, without the
a minimum 4per cent of

h e f i t of wtd agramenm, wdI ~ v c A
rd
f of wwld d e is e m frdkd d i r d y by monopoly combs~~abions,
Thip is a minimum statement of the case. Establishing the £act
that monopolits and cartels contra1 an &=lute majority of the
products entering world trade in itself does not tell the whole story.
It is possible for a monopoly or a cartel to hold a decisive position
in any given sphere of production and wade without actually conprollhg directly more than half the output. If the remainder of rhc
a d by Icds thaD 70 per a n t ; (c) codcream, by
which is meant loosely knit d t i o n s and conventions not necessarily
involving formal agmmcnrs but which do impose some d - t p p c rcguIationa 7 3 tbrrt
~ group
~
taken togaher control p.3 p cent of world
track (cads, za.3 per cent; pdd actdimtion, 5.3 pcr ant; conkenas, 14.7 ptr cent). Included, but dispasod among all t k group,
arc products antroiled by "Cxusta, Combioed with Grdhb'' w b
s h e O£ world trade is separaacly estimatsd at 17.8 per ant. In addition, another group of prodims arc M c d as "Attempts at Cartdim
tion"; this category, amounting to 6.3 pu cent of world trade, is not included ia the total cstjmau of 42.3 p cent. Still anathcr dadcation,
"Trusts, Not C o m b i d with carthtion," cavering products amounting to r r q pcr ctnt of wodd trade, is handhi s e p a d y and is not ind u d a d i n t h e t o t p l ~ t c o f t h c s h a r t o f t h cworldtradecdntrolkd
by
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The extent to which world urns arc p o d
natc a sphere of trade witbout en
mmts, the a c n t to which they ha
that the share of world trade controlid d i d y by them
at 1x4 per etnt.
At the same time, the tremendous sector of world trade
lpet
ant) controlled through the m d emphasizes the txtmt of d

(+

cardimtion. The cartels arc not only channels though whkh M
tnrsrs aeccise their domination over widu sectors; they are dd
the o e n d points of c o n t a c t 4 tnux or of cot&-for
the d
trusts t h d v w . Thus the mpe of world anelkation on the e a
of World War II indites, on the one hand, how fertile the pound
had b
e for even p t c r &cation,
and, on the other, the
extent to which &c cartels had bmmc the medium of she interm~~lopoly
conflict as a whole.

IV. PREWAR CARTEL STRUCTURE
Allocation of markets is the central function of the international
Whatever the device used-asignm~ts of sales territory, aport or production quotas, price agreements, patent trrchanp and
licensing& allocation of markets is d i r d y or indirectly involved,
Without this, the dwqslld lose its significance as an instrument
of industrial truce or regulated competition.
The whole dynamic of world capitalist relations is registad in
the allocation of markcts among the mel members. The rtal relation of power is established in the division or redivision of markers.
Such allmations are made in accordanm with thc relative strength
of the ampanics or m a participating in the -1.
But the acmd
s m n g t h of the trusts, as well as their potential for further expansion,
is determined by the relative position of their industry and tbdr
whole nariond economy, as w d as gcncrd political consideratiom
involving government pdicy and military powtr, BasicalIy, the caatl
structure d e c t s the whole complex of economic and political relations among the main capitalist powers. This is not fully c x p d in
every scparatt cartel, or in every sphere of industry and trade. The
=5
cart&
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rcacts very stnsitlvtly ta new economic d d o p
ments within this or that industry, and txprases through its eonstant
change and alterations the uneven and spasmodic nature of capitalist
development or decay. But the structure as a whole at any givm
ptriad presents a certain pattern of reIations corresponding to interimptriaEst and inter-monopoly relations as a wh&
The world cartel s m ~ t u f twhich a r a after World War I
was built essentially around a b e w a y relationship among tht
monopolies of Germany, Britain and the United Statts. T h e entire
network of world cartels gravitated around this tripartite arrangement. Regionally, and m i d y on a world scale,the monopolists
of other lading countries played an important role, sometimw only
as satcllitts of one or thc other of the big three cartel partners, at orher
times in their own right. Thw France, through her own colonial
empire and also in Europe, played an important c a d role, as did to
a lesser cxttat rhe monopolists of Bclgium, Holland, Sweden, and
Italy. Representing a rising dominant p w c r in the Far East, and
already commanding a well dcvdoped industria base at home, the
Japancsc monopolists a
h appeared as leading participants in a
number of cards.
In general terms, tbe interwar artel structure was determind
by 'the following: (I) the r-gencc
of Germany after her defeat
in World War I as a leading imperialist power, largdy with the aid
of American capid, to serve as the center of =pitalist stabhtion
in Europe and as thc bastion against European revolution and Soviet
~ ~ U U I C C(;2 ) the further rapid development of the Unitcd States as
the leading industrial and financial power of the world, but as yet
without having developed her full potential in a drive for world
markets; and (3) the continued stagnation of Britain's industrial
economy and the h e r weakening of the Empire, so that she was
obliged to defend her world position against German, American,
and Japancsc encroachment rather than primarily to stek further
-ion
abroad. This general relation, presented htrc o d y in
barest o u h was the framework within which the cartel srructure
t m k shape after World War I.
In the allmtion of markets among the three maia d panicipants, t
h general principIe &at prevailed was to rcservc the trtmendous United Smta market for the Amcricanq while dividing
26
cartel structure

thc bulk of the rtmaindtr of the world market-with the usual UKatption of Canada and Latin America--among the monopolists of
Gumany, Britain, and their lesser partners. Canada and Latin
Amaia in most ass were treated as markets to be jointly shared
&idly by the British and American interests. From an analysis of
the c a d agreemmts found in the file of American firms by the
Dcparemcat of Justice, Edwards draws the following coacIusion:
"Sinet the primary interest of American participants- has
conshcd in the enjoyment of an ua~hdcngcdposition in the
rich domestic market of the United States, and perhaps the
Canadian market, they have usually k e n willing to sacrifice
possibiiti~of export and investment abroad as the price of such
a position. Similarly, foreign mmpanies havt k n willing u,
purchase protection in other markets by foregoing sales in the
United States." "
Naturally, this docs not establish t
k rule for all tht foreign
economic activities of American big business. The United States
did emerge during this period as the leading exporter of both goods
and capitd, raking over Britain's premier role in these spheres, and
this shows that the American monopolists did more than mtrcly
dominate the domestic market The powcrlul American trusts opcrating outside the m& as in &c auto and oil industries, as well
as those participating in the c m l s , expanded their share of thc
world market. If that share was not hgtr and failed to correspond
to tht actud weight of the U n i d Stam in tht world economy, this
was due to other factors, such as thc economic and political crises of
the interwar decades. Neverthtksq the general principle indimted
by Edwards did apply in the artel$ and undoubtedly played a role
in restricting American economic expansion abroad, as it did in
hindering foreign petration into thc American home market.
The monopolists of other countries were equally canccrned with pr+
p i n g their own home markets and their positions abroad from
M a n encroachment, as the cartel agreements- and increasing
gwtrnment import and export controls during this puiod demonstrate.

',

A 6ew tmmpks will & to illustrate the general principle
prevailing in the a h a t i o n of markets through the
a7

The agreement between du Pont and Imperial Chemhls, rantwed in 1939, @anted the American uust exclusive rights in the
United S t a b and Central Ameriea, wbile 1.C.I. retained the British
Empire with the maption of Canada. They agreed to exploit thc
Canadian, Brazilian, and Argentine markets througb jointly owned
mbaidiarics. The rest of th worid was left open in the du Pont-I.CJ.
apcmcntj for it was the subject of a separate agreement bethe British mst and I. G. Farhn.
Tht pattern of the agreements cohrms to the general relations
of the d u e t main powers in the world economy. In Ccnual America,
which the United States dominates, du Pont retained exclusive
rights. The arrangements for Canada, Brazil, and Argentina rek e d the predominance of British and American economic pens
tration into thest countries over that of Germany and o h r powers.
These arrangements also registered the fact that in the field of
chtmicafs Ammian penetration w a s h d y smng enough to force
the older British intermits in t k countries to share the marktt by
agreement. Leaving the remaining m 1 d markets to the British and
German interests indicates that in this particular industry the American crust was not yet ready, or did not find it tssmlial, to extend
on any major scak into broader fields. Of course, the c a r d agreement in itself dots not tell the whole story. I. G. Farben had large
direct interests in &c American &emid industry, as did du Pont,
Standard Oil, and others in the German. But the allocation of
markets in the wtcl pact doa rdkct the actual power relationship.
A more direct form of the three-way allocation of markets is
illustrated by the alkali cartel, as & in 1g3q. I. G. F a r h
together with its assaciated Belgian trust, Solvay, & a i d exclusive
rights to the European continent, while the American inmsts held
d u s i v c rights to North America (including Canada and Ceotral
America), and I.C.I. main4 most British +ens and various
other areas. The American producers and 1.C.L shared South h r ica and tbc Dutch East India between them. It is interesting to note
that in Argmtha the agrcunent recognized thc predominant p i tion of Britain by apportioning ~5 per cent of that market ta LCJ.,
until 1936when the American quota was r a i d to 35 per cwt.
Ratim vary from industry to industry, and even from ont p d uct to' another. En the agreement on tungsten carbide, which pro28
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vides the bcst cutting edge for &e
-Is, the German h p p
tTUst agreed not to s
d in the United States in return for Gcncral
ElccWs commitment not to a p o r t the product. A similar agmm a t prevded in the autogiro industry. The Autogiro Co. of America, which held exclusive patents rights for the United States, agreed
to l a v e the rest of the world to the Cierva Autogiro Co. of London,
and the latter agreed to keep out of thc American market.
An agreement still in effect at the outbreak of war in 1939was
made fourteen ycam earlier betwetn International General Electric
Co., Radio Corp. of America, Westinghouse Electric International
Co, and the N.V. Philips combine allocating markets for radio
equipment. Thc exclusive territory of the American group was deb e d as Canada and the United States, while Pbilips w a s ganted
exclusive rights to H o h d (including thc DutGh empire), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Esthda, FinIand, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland.
In some c a w , a mu& larger share of the foreign market was
granted the American interests. For example, in a pact governing
moving-picture rewrding and reproducing apparatus between the
Icading Amerimn concerns and the German and Dutch companies
in 1930,the latter were given exclusive rights to eleven European
countries and the Dutch East Indies, while the Americans received
the United S ~ t c s Canada,
,
Australia, New Z d m d , India, the Straits
Stttlcmcnts and the exclusive right to sell to the Soviet Union, Xn aa
agreement on d i d engine between G c n d Electric and two German firms, the American eust obtained all countries outside of
Europe and the Dutch colonie8.

I

World War XI has rendered the allocation of markets under

the prewar cartel system obsolete. While thue arc exceptions, and in
a number of fields tht prt-war cartel pacts wiH undoubtedly be re
sumed with some revism, in tht main the old market allocations
no longer cormpad to

tht new relationships merging from the

war.

The American monopolists are no longer satisfied with the a b
cations pmailing bdore the war. The dtvelopmmt of the American
war economy raising production capacity and tcehaique to a new
high hd,and the weakening of the ottrer leading capitalist cow-

&greatly improve the position of the American trusts in the world
economy. They can be cxpectcd to drive energetically £or a r e
allmrion of world mums and markets, in which thdr strengthd p i t i o n will be more fully registuad.
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